AMERICAN WAR DOCTRINE GOES AROUND AND COMES AROUND

by Fred Edwards

March 12, 2010 — During a speech hardly noted by the press, Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pronounced a dramatic new war doctrine March 3. Let’s see how we got here and what it means.

In late November of 1984, the United States was reeling from the loss of 266 U.S. Marines in Lebanon the previous October 23. The Marines had been deployed there with no fixed mission and no known national interest. This tragedy had occurred on the heels of a war in Vietnam that had ended in disaster.

The United States also was conducting a murky mission in Central America. The slaughter of the Marines and the adventurism in Central American had created a policy struggle between Secretary of State George Shultz and the State Department and National Security Council on the one hand, and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and the Pentagon on the other. At the National Press Club on November 28, Weinberger announced a new warmaking doctrine that established the following six conditions to be met before the United States became involved in a military conflict.

1. The vital interests of the United States or its allies had to be at stake.

2. Sufficient force had to be applied to ensure an intention to win.

3. Political and military objectives had to be clearly defined.

4. The objectives had to be continuously reassessed.

5. Troops would not be committed without a reasonable assurance of support by American public opinion.

6. A combat role should be undertaken only as a last resort.

The third condition quoted the Prussian military philosopher, Carl von Clausewitz: “No one starts a war–or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so–without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war, and how he intends to conduct it.”

U.S. policymakers and military leaders diligently followed the Weinberger Doctrine in the Gulf War of late 1990-early 1991. But the United States was facing a new international scene of civil wars, ethnic conflicts, failed states, and rogue nations. So decisionmakers fell prey to tendencies to ignore Clausewitz, and to overlook the phrase “as a last resort.” We reverted to the concept of using limited military forces for political reasons involving questionable vital interests.

With this came the Clinton Doctrine, derived from a speech that President Bill Clinton made Feb. 26, 1999. He said in part, “If somebody comes after innocent civilians and tries to kill them en masse because of their race, their ethnic background or their religion, and it’s within our power to stop it, we will stop it.” In short, the United States on its own authority would forcefully intervene to prevent human rights abuses when it could do it without suffering substantial casualties.

So we became the world’s police force.

Then Sept. 11, 2001, brought the Bush Doctrine, in which President George W. Bush said, “To forestall or prevent . . . hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, act preemptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense.”

At this point we would stage preemptive war if felt it was warranted. So we had gone from commitment of troops without a mission, to war only as a last resort, to war whenever we felt the moral need to help others, and finally to preemptive war for self-protection.

Then came Mullen’s new doctrine of March 3.

• In future wars, the United States must use measured and precise military strikes, and not overwhelming force.

• Policymakers should consider the use of military force not as a last resort solution in a crisis, but as part of an early response to a conflict or a natural disaster.

• Military forces are some of the most flexible and adaptable tools available to policymakers. Before a shot is even fired, we can bolster a diplomatic argument, support a friend or deter an enemy.”

Embedded in the doctrine is the concept that troops must assume greater risk in order to protect innocent civilians in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. In addition, it seems that this once again would make the American way of war a diplomatic tool to be used at the drop of a fork.

Indeed, Mullen said, “There is no single, defining American way of war. It changes over time, and it should change over time, adapting appropriately to the most relevant threats to our national security.”

Source: Crosshairs - Military Matters in Review at www.milmat.net by Fred Edwards; Used by Permission.

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